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Abstract 
This paper is devoted to the the search of robust 
solutions in state space graphs when costs de­
pend on scenarios. We first present axiomatic re­
quirements for preference compatibility with the 
intuitive idea of robustness. This leads us to pro­
pose the Lorenz dominance rule as a basis for ro­
bustness analysis. Then, after presenting com­
plexity results about the determination of robust 
solutions, we propose a new sophistication of A* 
specially designed to determine the set of robust 
paths in a state space graph. The behavior of the 
algorithm is illustrated on a small example. Fi­
nally, an axiomatic justification of the refinement 
of robustness by an OWA criterion is provided. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In heuristic search in state space graphs, the value of an 
action allowing a transition between two nodes is usually 
represented by a scalar cost and the quality of a path by 
the sum of the costs of its arcs. In this framework, useful 
constructive search algorithms like A* and A; (Hart et al., 
1968; Pearl, 1984) have been proposed, performing the im­
plicit enumeration of feasible solutions, directed by a nu­
merical cost function to be minimized. However, in many 
practical search problems considered in Artificial Intelli­
gence (e.g. path planning, game search, web search), the 
scalar-costs assumption in state space graphs does not fit, 
thus inducing additional sources of complexity for prob­
lem solving. For this reason, recent works use alternative 
assumptions and consider, for example, the problem of: 
• dealing with multiple criteria: this concerns problems 
where the value of an action making a transition be­
tween two nodes must be evaluated according to differ­
ent attributes, expressed on non-commensurate scales, non­
necessarily reducible to a single additive cost function. In 
such problems, the state space graph representation with a 
vector-valued cost function is useful and leads to several 
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possible extensions of A*, e.g. MOA * to find all the ef­
ficiem paths (Stewart and White III, i 99 i ), U* to find a 
maximal path according to a multiattribute utility function, 
ABC* to find paths which best satisfies a set of prioritized 
soft constraints (Logan and Alechina, 1998). 
• dealing with uncertainty: this concerns problems where 
the cost of the arcs are ill-known and characterized by 
uncertainty distributions. For example, when costs are 
time dependent and representable by random variables, the 
SDA * algorithm is used to determine the preferred paths 
according to the stochastic dominance partial order (Well­
man et al., 1995). A sophistication of this algorithm spe­
cially designed to cope with both uncertainty and multiple 
criteria is proposed in Wurman and Wellman (1996). 
In this paper we consider another variation of the search 
problem under uncertainty, that concerns situations where 
costs of paths might depend on different possible scenarios 
(states of the world) or come from discordant sources of in­
formation. In this context, our aim is to focus on the idea of 
robustness and the search of robust solutions as introduced 
in the following example: 
Example 1. We want to find the "best" path in the state 
space graph pictured on Figure 1 from a source node a to 
a goal node 11 or 12 in a context where two different sets 
of costs must be considered. 
Figure 1: The state-space graph. 
This formal problem could be derived from different practi­
cal situations requiring decision making under uncertainty. 
For instance, consider an ambulance driver who wants to 
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Path Nodes 
1 (a,b,{!) 
2 (a,b,c,{!) 
3 (a,b,C,/2) 
4 (a, b, d, c, 1!) 
5 (a, b, d, c, /2) 
6 (a, b, d, 12) 
7 (a, c, 1d 
8 (a,c,/2) 
9 (a, d, c, 1d 
10 (a, d, c, /2) 
11 (a,d,/2) 
Costs 
(9,9) 
(12,6) 
(10,7) 
(10,11) 
(8,12) 
(12,11) 
(13,5) 
(11,6) 
(6,11) 
(4,12) 
(5,11) 
Table I: The set of solution-paths. 
rush a man from point a to one of the city hospitals lo­
cated in 11 and /2· Assume that two scenarios s1, s2 on 
the traffic in the city are considered, leading to a cost vec­
tor of type ( c( sJ), c( s2)) on each arrow. The problem is 
to determine the best destination and the best path. As an 
alternative example, consider a planning problem for an 
autonomous agent whose current objective is to reach one 
of the goal states {1 or 12 from the initial state a. The 
cost of each possible action is estimated by two external 
sensors located in different places and the agent does not 
know which is the most reliable sensor during the decision 
period. In both problems, one might be interested in find­
ing a "robust" solution, i.e., a path which remains suitable 
whatever scenario (or sensor) is considered. This idea of 
robustness is consistent with the view of Kouvelis and Yu 
(1997) and Vincke (1999) but differs from the robustness 
considered in A ron and Van Hentenryck (2002) concerning 
minimal spanning tree problems with imprecise costs. The 
major difference is that, in our context, costs are linked to 
scenarios, thus making some combinations impossible. For 
example, considering Figure I ,  the effective cost of path 
(a, b, c) cannot be 7, because (a, b) and (b, c) cannot get 
simultaneously costs like 5 and 2 (or 3 and 4) respectively. 
Considering the graph pictured on Figure 1, the costs vec­
tors of solution-paths are listed in Table 1. 
Facing such problems, simple scalarizations of cost-vectors 
do not lead to convincing results. For instance, using the 
average of the costs yields, among others, path I 0 which 
is the worst solution if scenario s2 occurs. Performing a 
weighted sum of the costs does not solve this problem ei­
ther. Indeed, by geometrical arguments, it can easily be 
shown that solutions I and 3 cannot be obtained by min­
imizing a weighted sum of costs (they do not belong to 
the boundary of the convex hull of the points represent­
ing paths in the criteria space). Finally, focusing only on 
the worst cost over the scenarios (minimax criterion) is not 
really satisfactory due to overpessimistic evaluation. For 
example solution 3 cannot be obtained by the minimax cri­
terion despite its promising costs due to the presence of the 
-indeed interesting- solution I. Note that the dominance 
order is not more adequate since it yields too many solu-
tions (paths 10, II, I, 3, 8, 7). These observations show 
the inadequacy of standard decision criteria to account for 
the idea of robustness as introduced above. Thus, the aim 
of the paper is: 
• to propose an axiomatic framework for robustness and a 
formal definition of robust solutions, 
• to introduce new algorithms to determine robust solutions 
in state space graphs. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to 
the formal definition of robustness. Section 3 presents com­
plexity results concerning the search of robust solutions and 
a heuristic search algorithm to find the set of robust paths 
in a state space graph. Finally in Section 4, we provide an 
axiomatic justification of the refinement of robustness by 
an OWA criterion. 
2 DEFINING ROBUSTNESS 
Considering a finite set of scenarios S = {s1, • • •  , sm}, 
any solution-path can be seen as an act c : S -t 1!4 in the 
sense of Savage (1954), characterized by the cost vector 
(c(s1 ), • • •  , c(sm)) in IR+ whose ith component represents 
the cost of the path with respect to scenario si. Hence, 
the comparison of paths reduces to the comparison of their 
cost-vectors. In this framework, the following definitions 
are useful: 
Definition 1. The Weak-Pareto dominance relation (WP­
dominance for short) on cost-vectors ofiR+ is defined, for 
all x, y E IR+ by: 
x '(,p y ¢==> [ViE {1, ... ,m},xi::; Yi)] 
The Pareto dominance relation (P-dominance for short) on 
cost-vectors ofiR+ is defined as the asymmetric part of'(,p: 
x >- p y ¢==> [x '(,p y and not(y '(,p x)] 
Definition 2. Within a set X any element x is said to be 
P-dominated when y >- p x for some y in X, and P-non­
dominated when there is no y in X such that y >- p x. 
In order to decide whether a path is better than another, we 
want to define a transitive preference relation '(, on cost­
vectors capturing both the aim of cost-minimization and 
the idea of robustness. For this reason, the preference rela­
tion is expected to satisfy the following axioms: 
P-Monotonicity. For all x, y E IR+, x '(,p y =} x '(, y and 
X ';-p y =} X ';- y, 
where >- is the strict preference relation defined as the 
asymmetric part of '(,. This natural unanimity principle 
says that, if path x has a lower cost than path y whatever 
the scenario considered, then x is preferred to y, and this 
preference is strict as soon as x i' y. Then, the idea of 
robustness refers to equity in cost distribution among sce­
narios which can be expressed by the following axiom: 
Transfer Principle. Let x E IR+ such that Xi > x J for 
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some z,J. Then for all E such that 0 ::; E: ::; x; - XJ, 
x- E:e; + E:eJ ;::; x where e; (resp. eJ) is the vector whose 
i1h (resp. jth) component equals I, all others being null. 
This axiom captures the idea of robustness as follows: if 
x; > Xj for some cost-vector x E IR+.', slightly improv­
ing (here decreasing) component x; to the detriment of x J 
while preserving the mean of the costs would produce a 
better distribution of costs, and consequently a more robust 
solution. Hence, path l should be at least as good as path 
7 in Example l because there is an admissible transfer of 
size 4 between vectors (13, 5) and (9 , 9). Note that us­
ing a similar transfer of size greater than 8 would increase 
inequality in terms of costs. This explains why the trans­
fers must have a size E: ::; x; - XJ. Such transfers are said 
to be admissible in the sequel. They are known as Pigou­
Dairon rransjers in Sociai Choice Theory, where they are 
used to reduce inequality in the income distribution over a 
population (see Sen (1997) for a survey). 
Since elementary permutations of the vector (x1, • • •  , xm) 
that just interchange two coordinates can be achieved us­
ing an admissible transfer, and since any permutation of 
{ 1, . .. , n} is the product of such elementary permutations, 
the Transfer Principle implies the following axiom: 
Symmetry. For all x E IR+.' , for all permutations 1r of 
{1, .. .  ,m}, (xn(l) •···, Xn(m)) � (xJ, .. . , xm), 
where� is the indifference relation defined as the symmet­
ric part of;::;. This axiom is natural in our context. Since no 
information about the likelihood of scenarios is available, 
they must be treated equivalently. 
Note that the transfer principle possibly provides argu­
ments to discriminate between vectors having the same 
average-cost but does not apply in the comparison of vec­
tors having different average-costs. However, the possi­
bility of discriminating is improved when combining the 
Transfer Principle with P-monotonocity. For example, con­
sider paths 7 and 8 in Table l whose cost vectors are (13, 5) 
and (11, 6) respectively. Although P-dominance cannot 
discriminate between these two vectors, the discrimination 
is possible for any preference relation ;::; satisfying both 
the Transfer Principle and the P-monotonocity axiom. In­
deed, on the one hand, (11, 6) >- p (12, 6) and therefore 
(11, 6) >- (12, 6) thanks to P-monotonicity; on the other 
hand, (12, 6) ;::; (13, 5) thanks to the Transfer Principle ap­
plied to the transfer (13 - 1, 5 + 1) = (12, 6). Hence, 
we get: (ll, 6) >- (13, 5) by transitivity. In order to bet­
ter characterize those vectors that can be compared using 
such combination of the P-monotonicity and the Transfer 
Principle we recall the definition of Lorenz vectors and re­
lated concepts (for more details see e.g. Marshall and Olkin 
(1979); Shorrocks (1983)): 
Definition 3. For all x E IR+.', the Generalized Lorenz Vec­
tor associated to x is the vector: 
L(x) = (X(l) , X(!) + X(2) , .. . , X(!) + X(2) + . . . + X(m)) 
where X(l) 2': X(z) 2': . . . 2': X(m) represents the compo­
nents of x sorted by decreasing order. The kth component 
of L(x) is Lk(x) = 2:::�=1 X(i)· 
Definition 4. The Generalized Lorenz dominance relation 
(L-dominance for short) on IR+.' is defined by: 
Vx, y E IR+.', x ;:;L y <!===} L(x) ;:;P L(y) 
The notion of Lorenz dominance was initially introduced 
to compare vectors with the same average cost and its link 
to the transfer principle was established by Hardy et al. 
(1934). The generalized version of L-dominance consid­
ered here is classical (see e.g. Marshall and Olkin (1979)) 
and allows any pair of vectors in IR+.' to be compared. 
Within a set X, any element x is said to be £-dominated 
when y >- L x for some y in X, and L-non-dominated when 
there is no y in X such that y >- L x. In order to estab­
lish the link between Generalized Lorenz dominance and 
preferences satisfying combination of P-Monotonocity and 
Transfer Principle we recall a result of Chong ( 1976): 
Theorem 1. For any pair of distinct vectors x, y E IR+.', if 
x ;:;P y, or if x obtains from y by a Pigou-Dalton trans­
fer, then x ;:;L y. Conversely, if x ;:;L y, then there 
exists a sequence of admissible transfers and/or Pareto­
improvements to transform y into x. 
This theorem establishes ;:L as the minimal transitive re­
lation (with respect to set inclusion) satisfying simultane­
ously P-Monotonicity and the Transfer Principle. As a con­
sequence, the subset of L-non-dominated elements appears 
as a very natural solution to choice problems with multiple 
scenarios, as far as robustness is concerned. For this rea­
son, we investigate in the next section the generation of the 
set of L-non-dominated paths in a state space graph. 
3 SEARCH FOR ROBUST SOLUTIONS 
3.1 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
We investigate here the computational complexity of the 
search of the set of L-non-dominated solution-paths in a 
state space graph. Note first that the L-non-dominated so­
lutions are a subset of the P-non-dominated solutions which 
might be very numerous. We wish to evaluate the extend to 
which focusing on L-non-dominated solutions (rather than 
P-non-dominated solutions) reduces the size of the solution 
space. In this respect, the study of the pathological instance 
introduced in Hansen (1980) for the multi-objective short­
est path problem is quite significant (one looks for the set 
of P-non-dominated paths from a source node to a desti­
nation node, see Figure 2). In that bivalued graph, all the 
paths from node I to node 2p + 1 have the same average­
cost (whose value is (2P - 1)/2) but distinct costs on the 
first component (due to the uniqueness of the binary repre­
sentation of an integer). The resulting set of cost-vectors is 
{ (x, 2P -1-x ), x E {0, . .. , 2P -1 }}, which contains only 
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Figure 2: The pathological instance of Hansen. 
P-non-dominated elements by construction. Notice that the 
cardinal of this set is exponential in the size of the graph. 
However, due to the Transfer Principle, there exists only 
two L-non-dominated cost vectors (those minimizing the 
difference between their components). Unfortunately, it is 
also possible to exhibit pathological instance for our prob­
lem, such as the graph on Figure 3 (where every arc without 
cost-vectors is actually valued (0, 0)). Indeed, all the paths 
from node 0 to node 2p+ 1 have distinct Lorenz vectors and 
are L-non-dominated. The proof is similar to the previous 
one. The set of cost vectors associated with the solution­
paths of the graph is { ( 2x, 3 x 2P - x), x E { 0, ... , 2P -
1}}. Note that the second component is always greater 
than the first component for x E {0, ... , 2P - 1 }. Con­
sequently, the corresponding set of Lorenz vectors writes 
{(3x2P-x,3x2P+x), x E {0, ... ,2P-1}}. All Lorenz 
vectors have the same average-cost and distinct values on 
the the first component. Moreover, the size of that set is 
exponential in the size of the graph. Due to the potentially 
Figure 3: An instance where all paths are L-non­
dominated. 
exponential number of L-non-dominated paths, the follow­
ing proposition is immediate: 
Proposition 1. The problem of finding £-non-dominated 
paths in a graph is, in worst case, intractable, i.e. requires 
for some problems a number of operations which grows ex­
ponentially with the size of the problem. 
In other respects, one may be interested in the complexity 
of deciding whether there exists a path whose cost distribu­
tion L-dominates a given cost-vector. The following result 
establishes that this decision problem cannot be solved in 
polynomial time unless P = N P: 
Proposition 2. Deciding whether there exists a path whose 
cost distribution £-dominates a given cost-vector is an NP­
complete decision problem. 
Proof. We reduce the partition problem to our problem. 
instance: Finite set A= {a1, • • .  ,ap} and a size s(a) E 
z+ for each a E A. 
question: Is there a subset A1 <:::; A such that LaEA' s(a) = 
LaEA-A' s(a)? 
That problem is proved NP-complete (see e.g. Garey and 
Johnson (1979)). One constructs -in polynomial time- a 
graph as indicated on Figure 4 (where every arc without 
cost-vectors is actually valued (0, 0)). Deciding whether 
there exists a path from node 1 to node 2p + 1 such that its 
vector-cost L-dominates the vector ( I:aEA s(
a) I:aEA s(a)) 2 , 2 
amounts to solve the partition problem. D 
Figure 4: Reduction from partition problem. 
3.2 ALGORITHM 
Due to the existence of multiple scenarios, the search of 
a robust solution can be seen as a particular specification 
of a multi-objective path problems (the objectives corre­
sponding to the different scenarios). Several variations 
of A* have been studied to generate the P-non-dominated 
solution-paths in multi-objective problems, see e.g. Stewart 
and White III (1991); Dasgupta et al. ( 1996a). As the set 
of L-non-dominated solution-paths is included in the set of 
P-non-dominated solution-paths, we can use a sophistica­
tion of these algorithms that exploits the exact nature of 
L-dominance (using the idea of approximation of a prefer­
ence relation suggested in Pemy and Spanjaard (2002)). 
Let us briefly recall some essential features of multi­
objective A*. In a graph valued by cost-vectors, there pos­
sibly exists several P-non-dominated paths to reach a given 
node. Hence, at each node n, one stores a set G(n) of 
cost-vectors g(n) corresponding to P-non-dominated paths 
arriving in n. Moreover, a node n may be on the path of 
more than one P-non-dominated solutions. Consequently, a 
set H(n) of heuristic cost-vectors h(n) is assigned to each 
node n. Finally, at each node n, a set F( n) of evaluation 
vectors f ( n) is computed from all possible combinations 
{g(n) + h(n) : g(n) E G(n), h(n) E H(n)}. 
The algorithm we propose to compute robust solution-paths 
relies on this general pattern. Before presenting our search 
algorithm itself, we establish two preliminary results on 
which our pruning rule and our priority rule are grounded: 
Proposition 3. For any x, y, z E JR.+, [x 'r L y and y 'r p 
zj ==? X'rLZ 
Proof. By definition y 'r p z ===? y 'r £� z. Since x 'r L y 
we get x 'r L z by transitivity. D 
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Proposition 4. A cost-vector (x1, • • •  , xm) L-dominates 
any cost-vector (Yl, ... , Ym) such that :2:::;':1 Yi > m.X(i)· 
Proof. Assume that: (i) :2:::;':1 Y(i) > m.X(I) and 
(ii) 3k � m s.t. :2::::=1 Y(i) < :2::::=1 x(i)· We know that 
Y(i) > X (I) thanks to (i). Due to (ii), 3j E {1, .. . , k} 
s.t. Y(j) < xul �X (I) and therefore Y(k) < X (I) (because 
Y(k) � Y(j))· Then, we have :2::::=1 X(i) � k.x(i) which 
implies (iii) I::=l Y(i) < k.x(i) by (ii). Moreover, we 
have (iv) I:;':k+i Y(i) � (m- k)Y(k)· Since Y(k) � Y(j) 
<X(!) we have (m- k)Y(k) < (m- k)x(!) and therefore 
we get (v) I:;':k+1 Y(i) < (m- k)x(l) by (iv). Finally 
we get: :2:::;':1 Yi < m.x(l) by (iii) and (v) which yields a 
contradiction. D 
Here are the main features of our algorithm, where we ex­
pand labels rather than nodes: 
Output: we determine the set of L-non-dominated paths 
from the source node to a goal node. If several paths have 
the same L-non-dominated Lorenz vector, we detect only 
one path among them. 
Heuristics: like in MOA •, we use an admissible set H(n) 
of vector-valued heuristic costs, i.e. for any cost-vector c of 
a P-non-dominated path from n to a goal node, there exists 
h(n) E H(n) such that h(n) i::;P c. 
Priority: the search is totally ordered by a lexicographic 
order on evaluation vectors f(n) defined at each open node 
n. This evaluation function f(n) is obtained in two steps. 
We first compute F ( n), the set of all costs vectors of type 
g(n) + h(n) where g(n) is the cost-vector of any P-non­
dominated subpath arriving inn and h( n) is the cost of any 
vector in the heuristic set H ( n). Then, f ( n) is defined as 
the best element of the set { L ( x), x E F ( n)} using the 
following lexicographic order: 
L( ) L( ) :Jk { 'Vi< k: L;(x) = L;(y) X >-!ex Y ¢==> Lk(x) < Lk(Y) 
This is also the lexicographic order used to rank the open 
nodes by decreasing order of priority according to their 
evaluation vector f(n). The choice of that priority rule is 
motivated by two remarks: 
- a heuristic consideration: the early detection of a 
minimax-optimal solution-path1 potentially speeds up the 
search by providing the best bound to prune paths accord­
ing to Proposition 4. 
- a prudence consideration: at the goal nodes, such a prior­
ity rule guarantees to expand only labels corresponding to 
L-non-dominated solution-paths. 
Stopping condition: the algorithm is kept running un­
til there is no remaining subpath able to reach a new L-
1 Note that the greatest component of a cost vector is the first 
component of the corresponding Lorenz vector. 
non-dominated solution-path, i .e. all open labels are ei­
ther P-dominated by another label on the same node or L­
dominated by a solution-path already detected. 
Pruning: the Bellman principle does not hold for L­
dominance i.e. a L-non-dominated path could contain a 
L-dominated subpath. For example, assume that two sub­
paths P1 and P2 of costs (3, 2) and (1, 4) lead to the same 
node. It is easy to see that P1 >-L P2. However, if we ex­
tend both subpaths by the same subpath P3 of cost (3, 1), 
then P2 U Ps >- L P1 U P3. That is why, we must be very 
careful in pruning L-dominated subpaths during the search. 
Consequently, we use the two following pruning rules, that 
we apply at the beginning of each iteration: 
- we prune any subpath whose value of the evaluation func­
tion is L-dominated by (or equal to) an already detected 
solution-path; 
- we prune any subpath P-dominated by (or equal to) an­
other subpath at the same node, as it is usual in multiobjec­
tive heuristic search. 
Such subpaths cannot lead to new L-oon-dominated cost 
vectors at a goal node. Indeed, as soon as we assume 
there exists a strictly positive lower bound on each cost, a 
path is P-dominated by any of its subpaths. Consequently, 
by Proposition 3, if a subpath is L-dominated by an al­
ready detected solution-path, any extension will be also L­
dominated by the same solution-path. Similarly, if a sub­
path is P-dominated by another subpath at the same node, 
any extension will be also P-dominated (thus L-dominated) 
by the corresponding extension of the P-dominating sub­
path. For the convenience of the reader, we give now a 
detailed example to illustrate the behavior of the algorithm. 
Example 2. Consider the graph of Figure 1. The arc 
costs are shown beside each arc. The heuristic set at a 
node n is defined by the ?-non-dominated cost vectors 
of the arcs with tails at node n. Obviously, such vec­
tors under-estimate the remaining costs to reach a goal 
node, thus leading to an admissible heuristic. For in­
stance, the set of heuristics at node a is { (5, 3), (2, 6)}. 
Let [n, g, L(f)]p denote a label of a path from the source 
to node n, where g is the cost-vector of that path, L(f) 
is the Lorenz vector corresponding to the value f of the 
evaluation function and p is a pointer to the previous node 
along the path. The trace of the algorithm is indicated on 
Table 2, with the following conventions: * pinpoints the 
pruned labels whereas r' pinpoints the L-non-dominated 
solution-paths. The pruning rules speed up the explo­
ration of the state space graph, as shown hereafter. At it­
eration 3, label [d, (6, 6), (10, 17)]d is pruned since (6, 6) 
is ?-dominated by (2, 6) (three solutions-paths avoided). 
At iteration 6, label [1'1, (12, 6), (12, 18)]c is pruned since 
its evaluation is L-dominated by (9, 18). At iteration 7, 
labels [c, (10, 4), (11, 17)]a and [c, (3, 10), (11, 17)]d are 
pruned since their evaluations are L-dominated by (10, 17) 
(Jour solution-paths avoided). At iteration 8, there is no 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Table 2: Trace of the algorithm. 
more label and the algorithm stops. In all, the prun­
ing rules enable here to break the exploration of seven 
£-dominated solution-paths (over eight) before they reach 
a goal node. In other respects, note that the expansion 
of labels rather than nodes allows the expansion of la­
bels [c, (10,4), (11, 17)]a and [c, (3, 10), (11, 17)]d to be 
avoided. 
4 REFINING ROBUSTNESS 
As shown in Subsection 3.1, the set of L-non-dominated 
solutions is a subset of P-non-dominated solutions but it 
might contain an important number of elements. For this 
reason, we would like to refine the notion of robust solution 
by proposing a criterion allowing to discriminate between 
the L-non-dominated solutions. We propose here an ax­
iomatic result concerning the numerical representation of 
a preference weak -order !::; on X = JR+ consistent with 
L-dominance. 
The first axiom requires that the only relevant information 
to discriminate between solutions is the corresponding gen­
eralized Lorenz vector: 
Neutrality. For allx,y in X, L(x) = L(y) =? x � y. 
We may define a preference relation !::;' among Lorenz vec­
tors of L(X) = {v E lR+': 3x E JR+, v = L(x)} by 
setting, for any L, M, E L(X) 
L ';::_' M ¢? 3x, y E X, { 
L
�
) =Land L(y) = M 
x�y 
For the sake of convenience, we now use ';::_ instead of';::_' to 
denote the preference relation among Lorenz vectors. As 
we intend the preference relation to refine L-dominance, 
we need the following axiom: 
Strict L-Monotonicity. L(x) >-L L(y) =} x >-y. 
Then we introduce three axioms that can be seen as coun­
terparts of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) axioms 
adapted for Lorenz vectors. 
Complete weak-order. !::; is reflexive, transitive and com­
plete. 
Continuity. Let L, M, N E L(X) such that L >-M >-N. 
There exists a, (3 E]O, 1[ such that: 
aL + (1 -a)N >- M >- (3L + (1- (3)N 
Independence. Let L, M, N belong to L(X). Then, for 
all a E]O, 1[: 
L >- M ===:. aL + (1- a.)N >-aM+ (1- a)N 
It is important to observe that this independence axiom 
is a weakening of the usual independence axiom on X, 
obtained by restriction to comonotonic vectors, where x 
andy in X are said to be comonotonic if x; > Xj and 
Yi < Yi for no i,j E {1, . .. , m} . Indeed, for any pair 
x, y of comonotonic vectors, there exists a permutation 1r 
of {1, . .. , m} such that X,-(1) 2: X�r(2) 2: . . . 2: x,.(m) 
and Y�r(l) 2: Y�r(2) 2: . . . 2: Yrr(m)· Consequently, 
L(a.x + (1 
-
a)y) = aL(x) + (1 - a)L(y). Hence, 
for all comonotonic vectors x, y, z E X, if x >- y ===:. 
ax+ (1-a)z >-ay + (1- a.)z then L(x) >-L(y) ==} 
aL(x) + (1- a)L(z) >- a.L(y) + (1- a)L(z). Observ­
ing that for any triple L, M, N of Lorenz vectors, there 
exists x, y, z, three comonotonic vectors in X such that 
L = L(x), M = L(y) and N = L(z), we deduce that 
usual independence on X implies independence on L(X). 
Note that weakening the usual independence is necessary 
in our framework due to its incompatibility with the Strict 
L-monotonicity axiom, as shown by the following: 
Example 3. Let us consider x = (24, 24), y = (22, 26) 
and z = (26, 22). Due to Strict L-monotonicity x >- y. 
Hence, usual independence would imply (25, 23) = �x + 
�z >- �y + �z = (24, 24) which is in contradiction with 
(24, 24) >-L (25, 23). 
The conflict here can be explained as follows: on the 
one hand, the cost-dispersion of vector (25, 23) resulting 
from the combination of x and z is greater than that of 
x = (24, 24); on the other hand, the cost dispersion of 
vector (24, 24) resulting from the combination of y and z 
is smaller than that of y = (22, 26). This situation cannot 
occur when x, y and z are pairwise comonotonic, which 
explains the very idea of our independence axiom. 
Actually, a similar idea was already present in Dual Choice 
Theory under Risk (see Yaari (1987)) in the form of the 
Dual independance axiom. The link with Yaari's theory 
UA12003 PERNY & SPANJAARD 475 
under Risk is natural here since Lorenz vectors can be seen 
as counterparts of cumulative distribution functions in de­
cision under risk. 
Before introducing our representation theorem, we need to 
show that L( X) with the usual convex combination in vec­
tor spaces is a mixture set (Herstein and Milnor, 1953): 
Definition 5. A mixture set is a set M and a function f 
that assigns an element f(a, x, y) =ax+ (1- a)y inM 
to each a in [0, 1] and each ordered pair (x, y) in M x M 
such that: 
Ml. 1x + 0y=x, 
M2. ax+ (1- a)y = (1- ay) + ax, 
M3. a[$x + (1-$)y] + (1- a)y = (a$)x + (1-a$)y, 
for all x, y in Manda,$ in [0, 1]. 
We have: 
Lemma 1. L(X) is a mixture set with respect to the usual 
convex combination in vector spaces. 
Proof. We first establish that aL + (1 - a)M belongs 
to L(X). Consider two vectors x and y in X such that 
L = L(x) and M = L(y). It is easy to check that aL 
+ (1- a)M = L(ax + (1- a)y) and therefore aL + 
(1 - a)M E L(X). Then, M1 and M2 being straightfor­
ward, we only prove M3: a[$£+ (1- $)M] + (1-a)M 
= a$L+a.M -a$M +M -aM= a$L+(1-a$)M. o 
A linear function on a mixture set is defined as follows: 
Definition 6. 'P : M --t lR is linear if <p( ax+ (1 -a )y) = 
a<p(x) + (1- a)<p(y)foralla E [0, 1] andx, y EM. 
Note that here, since the mixture operation coincides with 
the usual convex combination in vector spaces, 'P is auto­
matically m-linear: <p(:L;:1 a;x;) = 2:.::1 a;<p(x;) with 
a; E [0, 1] for all i (proof by recursion). 
Moreover, note that the set { f; = (1, 2, . . .  , i -1, i, .. . , i) : 
i = 1, . . .  , m} is a generator set for L(X) (every element 
can be seen as a combination of those vectors of L(X)). 
Indeed, by setting £0 = ( 0, ... , 0) and fm+ 1 = fm, we can 
write e; = 2£;-f;_1 - £;+1 for alliin {1, . . . , m }, where 
e; is the vector whose ith component equals 1, all others 
being null. Consequently, every vector L of L(X) can be 
written: 
L = 2:.::1 L;e; 
with the convention £0 = 0 and Lm+1 = Lm. We can now 
establish our representation theorem: 
Theorem 2. A preference relation � satisfies Neutral­
ity, Strict L-monotonicity, Complete weak-order, Continuity 
and Independence iff there is a linear Junction 'P on L(X) 
such thatx � y <===> <p(L(x)) :<::: <p(L(y)) where: 
<p(L(x)) = 2:.::1 (2<p(£;) - <p(fi-1) - <p(fi+1 ))L;(x) 
and<p(fi)- <p(f;_l) > <p(fi+l)- <p(f;) > 0 for alli 
Proof. By Neutrality, x � y iff L(x) � L(y) and there­
fore assuming a complete weak-order on X amounts to as­
suming a complete weak-order on L(X). Using the clas­
sical result of Herstein and Milnor (1953) on mixture sets 
and Lemma 1, the following two statements are equivalent: 
- Complete weak-order, Continuity and Independence hold; 
- there is a linear function 'P on L(X) that preserves>--: for 
all L, ME L(X), L >-- Miff <p(L) < <p(M). 
For every vector L(x) of L(X) \ { £0} we have 2L;(x) -
Li-1 (x) - Li+1 (x) = x(i) - X(i+1) 2:: 0 fori = 1, . . .  , m 
with the convention Xm+l = 0. Hence 2:.:;:1 (L;(x) -
Li-1 (x)- Li+l (x)) = 2:.::1 x(i) - 2:.::1 x(i+1) = X (I)· 
Then the coefficients (L;(x)-L;_1 (x)-L;+1 (x))/x(I) are 
positive and add-up to 1. By them-linearity of <p, <p( £0) = 
0 and for every vector L(x) of L(X) \ {£0} we deduce 
thanks to Equation 1: <p(L(x)/x(I)) =<p(:L;:1 [(2L;(x)­
Li-1 (x) -Li+I (x))/x(1)]f;) = 2:.:;:1 [(2L;(x)-Li-1 (x)­
Li+! (x))/x(I)]'P(f;) = 1/x(l) 2:.:;:1 (2L;(x)- Li-1 (x)­
Li+1(x))<p(f;). Then multiplication by X(I) yields 
<p(L(x)) = :L:1(2L;(x)- L;-1(x) - Li+l(x))<p(£;) 
= 2:.:;:1 (2<p(f;)- <p(fi-1) - <p(fi+I))L;(x). 
Moreover, Strict L-monotonicity implies that 2<p( £;) > 
<p(fi+l) + <p(f;_I) since fi+1 + £;-1 >-- L 2£;, and <p(fi+I) 
> 'P( €;) since £; >-- [, ei+1· Conversely, if 'P( £;) - <p(£;_ I) 
> <p(f;+J) - <p(€;) > 0 for all i E {1, . . .  , m }, then Strict 
L-Monotonicity clearly holds. This concludes the proof. 0 
The linear function 'P on L(X) can also be written directly 
on X as follows: 
<p(x) = 2:.:;:1 (<p(f;)- <p(fi-1))x(i) 
for all x in X. We recognize an Ordered Weighted Average 
(OWA, Yager, 1998) with strictly decreasing and strictly 
positive weights w; = <p(€;) - <p(f;-1). This is consistent 
with a result in Ogryczak (2000), where it is shown that 
any solution minimizing an ordered weighted average with 
strictly decreasing and strictly positive weights is L-non­
dominated. 
Now we have a criterion 'P evaluating the cost of any 
Lorenz-vector L(x), we want to determine the optimal so­
lution paths according to <p. Actually, the algorithm intro­
duced in Section 3 can easily be modified so as to determine 
solution-paths minimizing 'P· It is sufficient to modify our 
priority rule by setting f(n) = argminxEF(n) <p(L(x)) 
for any open node n. Efficiency can be improved by a 
slight modification of our pruning rule. We have to prune 
any subpath having a cost-vector x such that <p(L(x)) > 
<p(L(p)) for some solution-pathp already detected. 
Example 4. Consider the graph of Figure 1 and assume 
that the decision criterion <p(.) is such that <p(£0) = 0, 
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<p(£1) = 0.9 and <p(£2) = 1 (so that the weights Wi = 
<p(fi) - <p(l'i-d add up to 1). It is easy to check that 
the labels are expanded in the lexicographic order used in 
the priority rule introduced in Section 3. Therefore, the 
trace of the algorithm is similar to the one given in Table 
2 until iteration 3. At this stage the solution-path I is de­
tected with a Lorenz vector (9, 18) such that <p(9, 18) = 
9(2<p(£1)- <p(fz)) + 18(<p(l'2)- <p(l', )) = 9. All the other 
open labels having a value greater than 9, the algorithm 
stops. This solution can be seen as pessimistic since fo­
cused on the worst case. Note that decreasing the strictly 
positive difference w1 - wz = 2<p( f 1 ) - <p( l'z) would pro­
duce a less pessimistic solution path among Lorenz optima. 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have introduced a formal model for robustness allow­
ing to reflect various behavior patterns towards robustness, 
depending on the choice of parameters <p ( fi ) ' s. It should 
be useful to investigate elicitation methods to construct 
these parameters. In this respect, transposition of elicita­
tion methods used for assessing utility functions deserves 
investigation. Another important issue might be to inves­
tigate the extension of our work when additional infor­
mation about the likelihood of scenarios is present. As­
sume for instance that the probability Pi of each scenario is 
known, the comparison of two cost-vectors might be per­
formed using second order stochastic dominance, which 
can be defined from Lorenz dominance using probabilis­
tic cumulative distribution functions as suggested in Moyes 
( 1999). Finally, notice that the idea of robust solution and 
the use of L-dominance is worth studying in other contexts 
in Artificial Intelligence like planning, valued constraint­
satisfaction problems and game search (Dasgupta et al., 
1996b ), but also in combinatorial problems studied in Op­
erations Research (see e.g. the concept of equitable solu­
tions in Ogryczak (2000)). 
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